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The Right To Communicate
HOWARD C. ANAWALT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Toward the end of the 1970s, international attention began to focus
on the creation of communication rights for individuals and groups who
neither own nor control portions of the large mass media of today. Com-
munication was recognized as an enormously important political instru-
ment and as a means of self-expression. It was argued that communica-
tion rights are inadequate if they protect only those who already possess
communication power. The power to initiate contact with important audi-
ences must be spread among large segments of the population, if commu-
nication is to serve democracy. Thus, the movement for a "right to com-
municate" was born.'
The right to communicate seems to have emerged as a proposed legal
concept in an article concerning direct broadcast satellites written by
Jean d'Arcy in 1969. "The time will come that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights will have to encompass a more extensive right than
man's right to information, first laid down twenty one years ago in Article
19. This is the right of man to communicate."' In the ensuing years the
right to communicate has been explored with some intensity in the
United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Its chief proponents readily acknowledge that is remains today "an idea
and an ideal", a possibility that may come into being.3
The concept received a strong boost in 1980, when the MacBribe
Commission issued its final report. The Commission recommended:
Communication needs in a democratic society should be met by the
extension of specific rights such as the right to be informed, the right
to participate in public communication-all elements of a new con-
* American member of the UNESCO Constitution on The Right to Communicate, 1982;
Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Kathryn Meier, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Similar concerns have become apparent within the United States during the past
decade and a half. Access to American media has been much debated. See Barron, Ac-
cess-The Only Choice For the Media- Government Obligation to Enforce First Amend-
ment, 48 TEXAS L.REv. 783 (1970); ARCHIBALD Cox, FREDoM OF EXPRESSION 56 (1981).
2. d'Arcy, The Right to Communicate, in J. RiCHSTEAD AND M. ANDERSON, CRISES IN
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 121 (1981).
3. "The Right to Communicate is an idea and an ideal...It is an idea inasmuch as it
exists as yet only in the conceptual stage... it is an ideal in that its supporters are working
to have it drawn up, defined and promulgated as a basic human right." Desmond Fisher,
The Right to Communicate: A Status Report, UNESCO, Reports and Papers on Mass Com-
munication, 94, p. 5.
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cept, the right to communicate.4
The Commission explained that the right to communicate is to be in large
part a remedy for modern mass communications which have characteris-
tics of monologue, that is, one way communication from an authoritative
source to a passive audience. "The demands for a two-way flow, for free
exchange, for access and participation, make a qualitatively new addition
to the freedom successively attained in the past."5
One of the immediate difficulties facing the right to communicate
movement is the problem of definition. The literature that has emerged
so far indicates that the right is intended to operate in two very different
domains. First of all, the right is seen as a means of establishing a legal
claim of individuals and groups to participate in the communication insti-
tutions of their respective societies. In this case, the right would create
some form of legal claim against national governments and probably cer-
tain private institutions as well.' Secondly, the right has been understood
as one which protects cultural diversity in a world which is increasingly
subject to the homogenizing influences of technology. In this second as-
pect the right to communicate is linked to some of the broader concepts
of a "new world information order" endorsed by many developing na-
tions.7 For example, one UNESCO consultation concluded that "the exer-
cise of the right to communicate presupposes the availability of adequate
facilities and their equitable distribution within and between societies." 8
4. MAcBRIDE COMMISSION, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 265 n. 17 (1980). The Interna-
tional Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, popularly known as the
MacBride Commission, was composed of individuals prominent in the field of communica-
tions from sixteen different countries.
5. Id. at 172.
6. A UNESCO right to communicate working group gathered in Ottawa, Canada in
September 1980 and agreed to a formulation of the right to communicate including the
following: "Everyone has the right to communicate. Communication is a fundamental social
process which enables individuals and communities to exchange information and opinions."
Desmond Fisher, The Right to Communicate: A Status Report, op. cit., Appendix D, p. 54.
The UNESCO Consultation on the Right to Communicate: Legal Aspects held in Bucharest,
Romania in February of 1982 concluded: "Active participation in the communication pro-
cess is regarded as the core of the right to communicate .... The public at large should be
enabled to make their opinions known through adequate channels of communication (press,
broadcasting and the like) even if through their representatives only, i.e., their spokesmen
(as different from media professionals). UNESCO, draft final report, Right to Communicate:
LeVg-5 Aspt.s, Ap.i l982, p. 3
7. The MacBride Commission report addresses the question of creation of a new world
information order primarily on the basis of the need for eliminating inequality in the com-
munication resources available to the various different national cultures in the world. "Ine-
qualities in communication facilities, which exist everywhere, are due to economic discrep-
ancies or to political and economic design; still others to cultural imposition or neglect... it
is for the international community to take the appropriate steps to replace dependence,
dominance and inequality by more fruitful and more open relations of inter dependence and
complimentarity, based on mutual interest and the equal dignity of nations and peoples."
MANY VOICES, ONE WORD, supra note 4, at 268.
8. UNESCO, Report of a consultation organized by the International Institute of Com-
munications and UNESCO, "The Relationship Between the Right to Communicate and a
VOL. 13:2-3
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In order to preserve cultural independence, it would be necessary to rec-
ognize the right of each of the many different cultures to a fair share of
communication capacity.
The scope of the right to communicate must be scaled down if the
concept is to have utility. The statement that there is a right to commu-
nicate suggests that there is a legally supportable claim against someone.
The definition of the right needs to be refined so that it reflects only
those elements which can be stated in terms of legal rights and obliga-
tions. For example, when speaking of an individual's right to communi-
cate to his or her fellow citizens, one can designate a legal right of access
to certain media, such as radio. The correlative duty would be the obliga-
tion of those in control of radio broadcasting to yield some portion of the
broadcast day to communications by individuals. The fact that such a
right of access is conditioned or limited does not undermine the notion
that it is a claim of legal right.
Let us pursue the matter of conditional access rights in more detail.
Assume that Mr. Jones, a citizen somewhere, wants to communicate to
his fellows concerning "desperate needs for changes in early childhood
education." Mr. Jones seeks a platform for projecting his particular sug-
gestions. He goes to the newspapers, but they will not publish. Perhaps
the editor is not interested, thinks Mr. Jones is simply eccentric, or be-
lieves the public has had enough of that subject just now. As a result of
the editorial decision, Jones gets no forum in the newspaper.
It may be, however, that in Mr. Jones' country there is a right to gain
access to radio at certain times to broadcast citizens' views. This might
require that the individual show that he or she express the views of a
certain size group, that the spokesperson pay for the broadcast, that the
broadcast is restricted to certain times and that time is available on a
first come first served basis. Even when so conditioned the opportunity is
a claim of right. When the conditions are met-size of group, tender of
payment, and place in line-then a competent tribunal can decree that
the opportunity to speak must be accorded. 9
Legally defined and enforceable rights must be contrasted with other
kinds of stated expectations. In the communications field, a right of ac-
cess to some existing public media can be posited as a legal right. How-
ever, the hope or expectation that given nations or groups of people shall
have a complete opportunity of cultural or individual expression cannot
be stated as such a right. The latter notion is admirable, and it is proba-
bly supported by the nations at large. Nevertheless, it cannot be shaped
into a legally supportable claim against someone or some things. This is
particularly true of the general claims of lesser developed nations to more
New World Information and Communication Bridge" Strasbourg Sept. 3, 1981.
9. It is critical that the person claiming access have some independent forum which will
hear and judge his or her claim. Without such a forum the right cannot be assured any
practical effect.
1984
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equitable representation in the world communications order. Assume that
the claim is stated in the form of a right, for example, "the right to com-
municate is a right of individuals, groups, peoples, and states to partici-
pate fully in and benefit from communication on a basis of full equality
with all other."' The primary defect in this definition is that it does not
state a claim of right that can be asserted against any particular nation or
international body. No single entity is responsible for denying this gen-
eral proposition of communication equality. Unlike the case of the radio
station, an aggrieved nation or people cannot find anyone or anything
that is obliged to fulfill the expectation. The addition of the phrase "right
to communicate" does not aid what is essentially an economic claim. This
difficulty is compounded by the lack of definition of essential terms. The
terms "equality" and "full participation" do not indicate sufficiently the
conditions, which once fulfilled, give rise to the perfected claim.
Some of those working for elaboration of a right to communicate
have acknowledged that it should not be burdened with such claims in
favor of economic equality.
The right to communicate is not a panacea for the world's ills. It is
not going to solve the problems of development, of a more balanced
communications flow, of fairer distribution of communication re-
sources nationally or internationally.",
Indeed, if the right is to be meaningful, such concepts should be elimi-
nated from the definition. The claims of economic equality relative to
communications are important internationally, but they should be pur-
sued in economic arrangements or in specific legal forums which can ac-
commodate them."
What then can the right to communicate be defined to include? In
general, it can be defined to include attributes of communication which
are not presently covered by international declarations. For example, Ar-
ticle 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights already declares
certain undoubted components of such a right. 3 These include the right
10. That phrasing of a "right to communicate" is based on the language of a "right to
development" submitted by the International Commission of Jurists to the Commission of
Human Rights, Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development,
Third Session, Geneva, Jan. 1822, 1982. E/CN.4/AC.34/WP.23, 12 Jan. 1982. The Draft Dec-
laration of the Right to Development aimed at realizing the full potentialities of each person
in harmony with the community.
11. Fisher, supra note 3, at 21.
12. Such legal forums dealing with communication include the International Telecom-
munications Union and the World Administrative Radio Conferences. Each of these is com-
petent to deal with certain claims to allocation of communication resources, for example,
appropriate allocations of the use of the radio spectrum.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810 at 71 (1948). Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
contains a similar declaration or right and entered into force among its signatories on March
23, 1976. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
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to freedom of opinion and expression and the rights to receive and to
impart ideas through any media. What appears to be lacking in this for-
mulation is clear assurance of rights to participate in the editorial func-
tions of media and rights of access to the media themselves. Article 19
does not spell out a right of even conditional access as in the radio access
example which has been discussed.' 4
At a meeting of legal and communications professionals in 1982 as-
tatement of the right to communication was considered which was limited
to stating obligations concerning provision of access and participation.
The text of the statement affirmed that the right to communicate is a
fundamental human right which includes the rights set forth in Article
19. The text then stated that in order to be effectively exercised it is es-
sential that adequate channels exist and "that individual groups who wish
to use those channels should have fair and equitable access to them, and
opportunities for participation in them, without discrimination of any
kind. . ." The draft further specified that restrictions on the exercise of
right to communicate, including exercise of access and participation
"should be strictly confined to those authorized by international
l a w . . . , , ,5
II. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES
Even when the right to communicate is scaled down to manageable
concepts such as access and participation, there remain definite divisions
among the points of view expressed by various nations and cultures.
Initially, there is the problem of domestic effect of international legal
norms. Basically, the existing international law system focusesprimarily,
and nearly exclusively, on relationships between states. Generally, inter-
national legal norms do not displace domestic legal institutions, nor do
they create rights which the citizens of a particular state may claim
against their own national government.'" There are exceptions to this
14. The author, as a participant in the UNESCO Roundtable on the Right to Commu-
nicate in Bucharest, Romania in February 1982 argued that Article 19 itself creates a claim
of legal right to some form of access: "In fact, it is the recognition of the inequality of
modern communication resources and development which has stimulated greater concern
with rights of access and participation. Article 19 speaks to these needs as well, when it
states that individuals have a right to 'seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media. . .' While it is doubtful that Article 19 intends to require that each
particular medium yield a portion of its communication space to all comers, it is equally
unlikely that the provision was intended to underwrite monopoly of effective communica-
tion means. It is more likely that Article 19 calls upon member states of the world commu-
nity of nations to provide at least some adequate forum for the interchange of ideas which
come from individuals or groups of people." UNESCO, "Right to Communicate: Legal As-
pects, a Consultation" Draft Final Report April 1982, Annex III, p. 45.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter recognizes this basic approach. It speci-
fies that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present char-
1984
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general approach, as when a treaty is determined to have domestic effect.
Since World War II, a new role of international law, namely, the protec-
tion of individual rights against government power, including the power
of one's own government, has begun to emerge. This movement chal-
lenges some of the basic propositions of the existing international order.
In particular, it may make it possible to perfect claims of human rights
against one's own government. The status of international law protecting
human rights can be described as one of flux at the present time. Gener-
ally, protection of human rights through internationally recognized rules
or enforceable norms appears to be growing and strengthening. 17
The Soviet Union is resistant to claims that international law may
supplant domestic law in the area of human rights. The Soviet view is
that the rights and duties of citizens of a given state are determined ex-
clusively by the national law of that state. Speaking specifically in refer-
ence to problems of communication rights, Iuri Kolossov, a Soviet legal
scholar and communications negotiator, stated: "International law cannot
regulate legal relationships within a particular state if only for the reason
that it has a coordinating and not subordinating character as distinct
from national law."18 Thus, at the international level, communication
rights and responsibilities must be viewed simply as a part of a general
system of international law, a system which imposes obligations which are
owed only by one national state to another. Furthermore, communication
rights do not exist in isolation from communication obligations. Since in-
dividuals are not truly the subjects of international law, according to the
Soviet view, individuals should not be permitted to make any authorita-
tive claim concerning communication rights based on international law.
Their sole basis of a claim is dependent on national legislation."
In addition to differences of opinion concerning the individual's ca-
pacity to enforce human rights guarantees, there exist basic differences in
ter .. " U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
17. International law can protect human rights in two ways. First it can create stan-
dards which are recognized by the individual nations and applied, in effect, as elements of
domestic law. Secondly, international law can posit norms and procedures which protect
human rights directly and which provide for mechanisms of enforcement of those rights
against one's own state. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, is probably the most straightfor-
ward exVamlel of art. aangmef, nt .v under ,. whcha. ,..,.,r....,.,.-a. ti-a has~.. ,, Ic ~o
over human rights violations claimed by individuals against their own state. As to those
countries which have specifically acknowledged the competence of the Human Rights Com-
mission to hear individual complaints, the Commission has authority to act. See O'Boyle,
Practice and Procedure Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 697, 700 (1980). Also see the procedure of the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1503, 20 REV. OF INT'L COMM'N OF
JURISTS 33 (1978).
18. UNESCO, Meeting of Experts on the International Issues of the Right to Commu-
nicate, Manila, Philippines, October 1979, "The Right to Communicate in International
Law" a position paper prepared by Iuri Kolossov, p. 4.
19. Id. at n. 50.
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philosophy concerning the function of communication in society. At the
risk of oversimplification, it is possible to identify three basic approaches
to communication which predominate in the world today. One of these is
what may be called the western point of view, which emphasizes commu-
nication freedom as a lively political process, as a set of journalistic free-
doms, and as an important commercial activity. This point of view is
"western" because it has grown up in the European societies which have
experienced the decline of feudalism and monarchy and the replacement
of these systems by some form of representative government. Freedom of
communication is valued as a means of exchanging ideas and a public
examination of competing political programs. Since the economies of
these countries have grown rapidly, both in their colonial and post-colo-
nial periods, communication resources have become intertwined in com-
mercial activity itself.
A second approach to communication, which may be called the devel-
opment of point of view, emphasizes that communication is an essential
process in the creation and preservation of national identity and national
economic and social strength. This view emphasizes the use of communi-
cation to serve the needs of lesser developed countries, countries which
for the most part have only recently emerged from the status of colonies
to full independence. The economic structures of these countries are rela-
tively weak by twentieth century standards.Communication is seen as a
means for building the economy, helping to improve health and literacy
standards and enhancing the self-image of these cultures. The developing
nations are particularly concerned with preserving the independence of
their cultures.20
A third view of communication may be called the Soviet view. This
appears to give little recognition to the need for legal protection of com-
munication voices which are independent of the party or the government.
The Communist party is seen as an organ which fully represents the peo-
ple. The party supervises ands coordinates the various activities of the
people, including the various aspects of mass media communication. This
view is called the Soviet view simply because it reflects communication
practices which have developed in the Soviet Union and which appear to
predominate in eastern European countries as well.
Present day application of principles of press freedom and press-
responsibility requires reference to Western doctrines, to Soviet doc-
trines, and to doctrines emanating from the lesser developed nations of
the Third World.
A. The Western-American View
Western doctrines are fairly well exemplified in Article 19 of the Uni-
versal Declaration and Article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. That is, the national law and traditions of most western nations
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1984
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and the practices in those nations reflect the proposition that the press
should be free to communicate, absent war or some other condition of
stress, and that this communication should be generally free of censor-
ship. The Soviet tradition, on the other hand, emphasizes Communist
Party control of the content of mass media, and thus rather explicitly
accepts censorship. The developing nations have, over the past fifteen
years, begun to inject a third voice into this worldwide debate over con-
trol of the content of mass media.It is too early to generalize effectively
what the position of the Third World is, especially since it is such a di-
verse phenomenon. However, many Third World nations appear to be ex-
pressing a philosophy that mass communications should be affirmatively
guided for the purposes of achieving national self-development and cul-
tural independence, but that they should not necessarily be subject to
negative censorship.
In international discussions of legal institutions to regulate media ac-
tivities, the Soviet and American views invariable square offagainst each
other. The United States view distills and emphasizes the freedom to
communicate element of international legal tradition, while the Soviet
view is a severe application of the doctrine of preservation of public
order.
On the issue of censorship, the United States position is a full and
unequivocal condemnation of government control of content. An enor-
mous variety of governmental interferences with freedom of inquiry and
freedom of communication have been struck down in the United States.
The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional government restriction
of Communist propaganda, criminal penalties for general advocacy of vio-
lence, enforcement of flag misuse statutes and injunctions against splinter
group political rallies including those by the Nazis.2 ' Freedom of commu-
nication, especially with respect to public demonstrations, was an impor-
tant element in the movements for civil rights and for termination of the
Vietnam War in the 1960's." The civil rights movement also resulted in a
virtual reformation of American defamation law, for it created a broad
new privilege to comment on public officials and public figures without
the monetary dissuasion of successful defamation actions. 3 Government
censorship in the United States is at a minimum largely because of the
role of active litigants and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
Censorship in the United States is therefore imposed principally through
21. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. (1978)) stay denied 436 U.S. 953 (injunc-
tion against splinter groups unconstitutional); Spence V. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(flag misuse statute unconstitutional); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (criminal
penalty for general advocacy unconstitutional); Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S 298 (1957) (restriction
of Communist propaganda unconstitutional).
22. See H. KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FiasT AMENDMENT (1965).
23. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (limitation placed on New York Times rule). The legal standard is that
one is privileged to defame a public figure or public official so long as statements are not
made with reckless disregard of the truth.
VOL. 13:2-3
HeinOnline  -- 13 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 224 1983-1984
RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE
private means such as editorial judgments, corporate policy pronounce-
ments and advertising determinations.
The American position, a minimum censorship principle, is based on
interpretations of the First Amendment made by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes shortly after the close of the First World War. Holmes' idea was
very similar to one expressed by John Milton three centuries earlier. 4
Holmes states that there is a market place of ideas where all communica-
tions are free to circulate.25 The best ideas will win attention and accept-
ance on their merits. For Holmes, and subsequent American thought and
practices, the marketplace is not a mindless sea of ideas, but is a constant
intellectual process. The press, therefore, is not aimlessly adrift, but is an
active part of society, presenting the ideas which hopefully will receive
thoughtful consideration and selection.
Justice Holmes' position is familiar. He believed that speech and
press could be free provided their activities did not pose any "clear and
present danger" to major government policies. As long as the state articu-
lated its goals in legislation, it could protect those goals from substantial
interference fomented by intentional communication activity.
Ultimately, Justice Holmes and his colleague, Justice Brandeis, be-
came very strict in their interpretation of what communication activity
could actually constitute substantial interference sufficient to punish the
speaker. A communicator could be punished only if his words or actions
posed a grave and intended threat to the public order, and if the threat
carried with it likely and immediate consequences."
But Holmes did not start out with a view which so strongly protected
speech and press. In fact, his "clear and present danger" test was first
articulated and applied when Holmes wrote several decisions of the Su-
preme Court which denied freedom of speech claims of individuals who
24. John Milton was the leading critic of the English 17th Century licensing system. He
observed that the censors' work was bound to be boring, "to be made the perpetual reader
of unchosen books and pamphlets, oftimes huge volumes." Milton readily admitted that the
power of the State must loom large in his life, but he argued, "the State shall be my
governours, but not my criticks; they may be mistak'n in the choice of a licencer, as easily as
this licencer may be mistak'n in an author .. " The licensing system was a cowardly one
to Milton, for it denied the strength of truth. He concluded his argument stating, "For who
knows not that Truth is strong next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, nor stratagems,
nor licencings to make her victorious, those are the shifts and the defences that error uses
against her power: give her but room & do not bind her when she sleeps, for then she speaks
not true .. "MILTON, AREOPAGrrMcA, reprinted in VERSIONS OF CENSORSHIP, 19, 21 3132 (J.
McCormick & M. Maclnnes ed. 1962).
25. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams
v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In the Abrams case, Holmes stated
that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market...", 250 U.S. at 630.
26. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S.
616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1984
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had protested against American involvment in the First World War.2"
The activity of these indivduals consisted merely of the publication of
leaflets, mailing of circulars, and delivery of speeches condemning the
American war effort and urging individuals not to support it. In Schenck
v. U.S.,28 the first of the WWI protest cases, defendants had mailed anti-
war circulars to draftees. In that case, Holmes declared that the commu-
nication activity of these men, including the Socialist leader, Eugene
Debs, could be condemned and punished by heavy jail sentences because
they spoke during a time of war, and thus undermined an effort which
demanded ultimate cohesion within the nation. "The character of every
act," he said, "depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." 9
The circumstance at hand was war, and the audience included those
who might fight or otherwise support the war effort. This was enough for
Holmes. "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight, and that no court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right."3 0 On this basis, Holmes led the
Court in affirming the convictions of the protestors.
On November 10, 1919, a scant eight months after the decision in the
Schenck case, Justice Holmes had a chance to reconsider his views. The
case, Abrams v. United States, 1 was strikingly similar to those cases de-
cided earlier that year. Abrams stood convicted of having conspired dur-
ing war-time to publish "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language" about
the United States government and language "intended to incite, provoke,
and encourage resistance to the United States in said war." The leaflets
involved had been printed up at night in New York city and distributed
by being thrown from windows and handed out secretly in that city. One
of the leaflets denounced President Wilson as a hypocrite and a coward
and stated that his "shameful, cowardly silence about the intervention in
Russia reveals the hypocrisy of the Plutocratic gang in Washington and
vicinity." The circular concluded with an appeal to the workers of the
world to awake and arise and "put down your enemy and mine! Yes!
friends, there is only one enemy of the workers of the world and that is
CAPITALISM. 3' The majority of the United States Supreme Court found
the leaflets plainly urged and advocated resorting to a general strike
which might cripple the production of necessary munitions during time of
war. This activity was found by the majority to be sufficient to sustain
the convictions.
Justice Holmes, however, perceived something wrong in the affirm-
ance of these convictions. In his analysis, the earlier cases had been
27. Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
28. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52.
30. Id.
31. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
32. Id. at 620.
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rightly decided. But built into those cases was a point of resistance
against government suppression of ideas, even impassioned appeals dur-
ing a crisis like war. In order for a danger to be clearly and presently
evinced by a mere communication, it would be necessary for the govern-
ment to prove that criminal defendants had a specific intent "to produce
a clear and imminent danger that it (speech) will bring about forthwith
certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek
to prevent." 33 In effect, the defendant must be convicted of an attempt to
interfere with the war effort. Inflammatory phrases, including urging of a
general strike and the suggestion that workers use weapons, did not, in
Holmes' opinion, amount to an attempt to achieve results. These views
have matured in American jurisprudence and now form the core of a pro-
tection of political speech which permits no punishment of a speaker un-
less the speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action. '3 4 This protection of
political speech, coupled with firm protection against prior restraints or
censorship, is the foundation of current American doctrine concerning
governmental interference with speech and press.
B. The Soviet View
The Soviet point of view on international communication freedom
and responsibility reflects a strong orientation toward preservation of
public order. The Soviet position bears the marks of pre-revolutionary
Russian history and of the intense activity of the revolution, as well as
the imprint of Lenin's philosophy concerning the Communist Party.When
compared with the Russian revolution, the American revolution appears
as a rather easy severance of ties with a mother country. By and large, the
political institutions, the social mores, and the economic basis of the soci-
ety in the United States after the revolution resembled those of pre-revo-
lutionary days. In Russia, however, nearly an entire century of social and
political rebellion and realignment preceded the 1917 pair of revolutions.
When the Revolution of March 1917 occurred, Russian society was being
bled white by the First World War, and after the October Revolution the
entire nation was in turmoil. The Bolshevik Party was determined to set
the country on an entirely new basis, including a new economic and social
system. In order to accomplish his revolution, Lenin conceived of and in-
sisted upon a strict central control of political activity by the leadership
of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks would cooperate with other par-
ties in efforts to seize power, but they would not drive political bargains
with them or compromise what they determined to be basic principles of
Marxist political and economic organization. After seizing power in a rela-
tively bloodless and swift action in October 1917, the Bolsheviks intended
to carry forward a coherent policy based on Marxist interpretation of the
33. Id. at 627.
34. Brandeburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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productive forces of history.
Lenin, like the American Holmes, was concerned with the conditions
of wartime. However, in most other respects, his experience was vastly
different. The Soviet Union had only been in existence for a matter of
days and months when he drafted some of his original premises on com-
munication freedom and responsibility within the Soviet state. War and
internal political dissension (soon to be civil war) were occurring on Rus-
sian soil and threatened at any minute to engulf the fledgling Communist
state. Lenin was responsible for organizing his successful revolution at a
time when Justice Holmes was completing a long and distinguished career
as a judge. In the early years before the revolution, Lenin had emphasized
the essential role of the Communist party and of the media as a means of
planning and guiding the New Society. Lenin and the Bolshevik leader-
ship put these ideas in force immediately after seizing power.8 5 Within
days of the Bolshevik's seizure of power, Lenin issued a decree governing
the use of the press and advertising in the Soviet Union. These measures
included closing down those elements of the press which urged open resis-
tance or defiance to the new government, which sowed discord by dis-
torting facts and obvious slander, and which called upon the people to
commit patently criminal acts.
A Revolutionary Press Tribunal was empowered to try crimes and
offenses committed by the press, including spreading a false rumor or dis-
torting information. Paid advertising in periodicals was declared to be a
state monopoly, and advertisements were permitted to be published only
by ordinance of the Soviet government." The stiff pro-censorship regime
was created by these decrees.
However, even the initial decree indicated that strong party control
of the press should be regarded as the temporary measure, forced upon
the government and the party by the surrounding circumstances.
In the grave, crucial hour of the Revolution, and the days immediately
following it, the Provisional Revolutionary Committee has been forced
to undertake a series of measures directed against the counter-revolu-
tionary press of all hues and shades . . . as soon as the new order is
consolidated, every administrative measure of restriction with regard
35. On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, September 28, 1917, Lenin set forth some
ABOUT THE PRESS 186 (1972). In this essay he stated, "The capitalists (followed either from
stupidity or from inertia, by many S.R.'s and Mensheviks) call freedom of the press a situa-
tion in which censorship has been abolished and all parties freely publish all kinds of pa-
pers. In reality it is not freedom of the press, but freedom for the rich, for the bourgeoisis, to
deceive the depressed and exploited mass of the people." The opposi tion or bourgeois press
was seen to be a forceful weapon which would be used to exterminate Lenin's revolution,
something that no revolutionary would tolerate.
36. Decrees issued by V.I. Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:
the Decree on the Press, published November 10, 1917, On the Revolutionary Press Tribu-
nal published November 10, 1917, Decree on the Introduction of State Monopoly of Adver-
tising, published November 8, 1917. Id. at 205-09.
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to the press will be lifted; it will be granted a full freedom within the
limits of its responsibility before the courts, in conformity with the
broadest and most progressive press laws.
3
1
In addition, Lenin repeatedly urged that various independent groups
should be supplied with newsprint and printing presses in order to circu-
late their views."8 One such statement was contained in a draft resolution
prepared on November 17, 1917 and stated, "For the workers' and peas-
ants' government freedom of the press means liberation of the press from
capitalist oppression, and public ownership of paper mills and printing
presses; equal rights for public groups of a certain size (say, numbering
ten thousand) to a fair share of newsprint stock and the corresponding
quantity of printers' labor."' 9
Thus, the pro-censorship regime engendered by Lenin and his party,
was tempered by the pronouncements of Lenin himself. The strict censor-
ing position of the Communist party was to give way to a freedom of the
press for opposition points of view as soon as the regime's position was
stabilized. Taking these views seriously, it seems apparent that the Soviet
regime is obliged by the words of its founder to restore the opportunities
of individuals and groups to critique national and party actions through
editorially independent and multiple group presses."'
The press was viewed by Lenin as an organ of social control from the
time of his enforced exile in 1900 until his death in 1924. According to
him, Marxist analysis should not permit the underlying material realities
of society to be obscured by any superficial aspects, including heady dis-
cussions of ideas or theories. The press should not reflect just a spirit of
"freedom of criticism" but should represent an exposition of the actual
workings of society. In 1902 Lenin wrote:
"Freedom" is a grand word, but under the banner of Free Trade the
most predatory wars were conducted; under the banner of "free la-
bor," the toilers were robbed. The term "freedom of criticism" con-
tains the same inherent falsehood. Those who are really convinced
that they have advanced science, would demand, not freedom for the
new views to continue side by side with the old but the substitution of
37. V.I. LENIN, Decree on the Press, Id. at 205.
38. V.I. LENIN, On Freedom of the Press, Thesis and Report on Boureois Democracy
for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Draft Resolution. Id. at 188, 195, 208.
39. V.I. LENIN, Draft Resolution, Id. at 208.
40. The Soviet Union and the Communist Party should also be obliged to live up to
this promise by the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 50, of the 1977 Constitution of the
U.S.S.R. and its predecessors. Article 50 provides: "In accordance with the interests of the
working people and with a view to strengthening the socialist system, citizens of the USSR
shall be granted the freedom of: speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions, and
demonstrations.
The realization of these political freedoms shall be ensured by granting public build-
ings, streets and squares, extensive dissemination of information, and the possibility of us-
ing the press, television, and radio to the working people and their organizations." W. But-
ler, The Soviet Legal System 13 (1978).
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the old views by the new views. The cry "Long live freedome of criti-
cism" that is heard today, too strongly calls to mind the fable of the
empty barrel."'
The Leninist approach embodies the use of the media as a means of plan-
ning and guiding first a revolution and later a new society.
C. The Development-Third World View
There is no single approach to the problems of censorship which will
hold true for all of the developing countries or the Third World. These
countries are geographically dispersed and possess very different cultural
heritages. Furthermore, the historical development of most of these na-
tions has been altered by periods of colonialism which have, in some
cases, only recently terminated. Therefore, the legal traditions with re-
spect to the press embody elements from different traditions and have
not crystallized into a uniform or final pattern. Despite this, there is one
theme which is so prevalent that it can be called a general Third World
approach. This is the theme of development. Third World nations want
and need to channel their national energies into the political, social and
economic improvement of their cultures. Communication media are
viewed as a positive element in this development. These media are availa-
ble to circulate public health data, to generate support for public projects,
to assist in educating people and to mobilize general support for the prev-
alent policies of development. A basic philosophy for Third World coun-
tries is that communication should serve development.
The political structures of the developing countries differ widely.
Some of these countries have single party states, while others have multi-
party systems. The single party states present issues of freedom of ex-
pression which parallel those that are to be experienced within Commu-
nist systems. A basic issue presented in Third World nations with single
party regimes is the status of freedom of press. The International Com-
mission of Jurists recently inquired into this and other related matters in
a conference on human rights in a one-party state, held in Dares Salaam,
Tanzania. This conference exhibited a theme that one-party African
states should be recognized as very different from those established in a
Communist setting. Professor Telford Georges, formerly a chief justice in
Tanzania, urged that one major difference is that in Tanzania "there has
been no explicit founding of the one-party state on any identifiable politi-
c- thecr,. This me- that thee ic nn pnattrn nf legal thinking tn which
the judicial officer is obliged to conform-no party line on
jurisprudence." 42
41. V.I. LENIN, What Is To Be Done?, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LENIN, THE ISKRA
PERIOD, No. 2, 96-97 (1929). The reference to a barrel is to a fable by Krylov. When a full
barrel and an empty barrel are rolled down the street, the empty barrel will make much
more noise than the full one.
42. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE- PARTY STATE
(1978). Quoted statement is part of an address delivered by Professor Georges originally in
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Participants in the one-party human rights conference appeared to
acknowledge that the range of freedom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation in such a system is necessarily limited by restrictions on the right
of organizing political opposition and prohibitions on the right of organiz-
ing political parties. In order to assure meaningful opportunities for pop-
ular participation in the formation of government policy, it is of great
importance that the press be free to vent new ideas and considerations. A
workshop of leaders from the various participating countries concluded,
"Continued freedom of the press was probably the most important ele-
ment of freedom of expression and workshop participants were fully
agreed on the need for its protection.' 4 The workship pointed out that it
was difficult for the press in a one-party state to criticize fundamental
positions of the party, but nevertheless the freedom of the press to criti-
cize was essential. The press should function as a principal check on er-
rors or abuses of the party itself. Emphasizing the positive role of the
press, the workshop states that "it has also a powerful and valuable role
to play as an educator of the public in the important issues of the day, in
helping to form public opinion and in popularizing the significance of the
rule of law and fundamental human rights."'4 4 The press is thus seen as
integral and essential to the process of achieving political freedoms in a
one-party state context.
In situations where the press is supported or sponsored by the gov-
ernment the protections should come in the form of legal or political
guarantees. For example, the small African country of Rwanda recently
set up its first national newspaper. The newspaper is small, comprising
eight pages. The front page will usually contain a picture, a major edito-
rial, news items and a table of contents. The rest of the paper includes a
section regarding the nation, regions, the party, Africa at large, social and
home questions, news concerning the capital city, Kigali, and sports and
entertainment. A UNESCO advisor who assisted in setting up the paper,
Diomansi Bombote, was concerned about the need for popular expression
and criticism in such a newspaper. If it was absent from the newspaper,
there would be no significant national forum. Furthermore, the voice of
the government might well be heard to the exclusion of other points of
view.
Mr. Bombote resolved this problem by an implicit agreement with
the Minister of Information of the government. He asked the minister
whether he wanted a newspaper: "Of course," was the reply. "But do you
also want people to read the newspaper?" Again, the minister replied,
"Yes." "Then you must allow criticism of the ministers and the govern-
ment within the newspaper," suggested Bombote. Thus, a bargain was
December 1965.
43. The Conference included 37 active participants from the following countries:
Zambia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Barbados, Swaziland, Switzerland, Botswana, United
Kingdom, Lesotho and Kenya.
44. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 42, at 85.
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struck - freedom of commentary would be allowed to the editors and a
section would be provided for letters from the readers to be published in
the newspaper. The result is fragile. Editorial freedom within this essen-
tial medium must be reaffirmed on a day to day basis.
Thus there is evidence that the developing countries are articulating
a philosophy of mass media which emphasizes media as an educator or
leader in public affairs. This may entail for example, a different attitude
to what constitutes news. A distinguished Indian journalist, Narinder Ag-
garwala, has commented on the positive function of news:
News, to my thinking, is what happens, and the most important thing
happening in the Third World, even more important than coups, fam-
ine and civil wars, is social and economic change, imperceptively slow
and miserable, invisible against the backdrop of enormous problems,
but nonetheless a reality. Efforts to control endemic diseases which
constitute a matter of life and death for millions of people of Africa,
the Middle East and Asia, or the introduction of animal traction for
farming in Paraguay will not sound impressive; to 300,000 farmers of
that country, it is comparable to the introduction of the steam engine
in the West. Bangladesh, once condemned as a perennial international
basket case by Henry Kissinger, is now on the verge of achieving self-
sufficiency in food. India, not long ago considered synonymous with
hunger and famine, today has the world's second largest food binbuf-
fer. All of these are instances of important changes happening in the
Third World which remain unreported in the international media.4
Development news and media coverage emphasizes the positive-the pos-
sibilities of achievement and the methods of getting certain jobs done. A
developing country's philosophy on censorship may very well be to insti-
tute some form of "positive" censorship or an editorial function which
would insist on the reporting of events and methods which will genuinely
aid development. There is no reason to expect that this positive editorial
function will carry with it any kind of insistence on "negative" censorship
or the interference with the free expression of criticisms, comments and
divergent new ideas. Caution must be used, however, to avoid affirmative
requirements which become so burdensome that they undermine the free-
dom to communicate.
III. CONCLUSION
The three approaches which have been described place different em-
phasis on the relative importance of freedom to initiate messages, on the
one hand, and the need to control content of messages in the name of
public order, on the other. These two concerns are present in the basic
norms of international law which are recognized today. Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes freedom to communi-
45. Address by Narinder Aggarwala, News Values in International Reporting, deliv-
ered at Who Makes News, University of Santa Clara Conference, (April 1981), reprinted in
Peace Research.
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cate messages. This freedom is recognized as an essential component of
human rights. Article 29 of the same Declaration emphasizes the impor-
tance of public order and recognizes that communication rights, like other
individual rights and freedoms, may be limited by law in order to meet
"the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society. '46 On a spectrum which emphasizes complete
communication freedom at one end and complete control in the name of
public order at the other, one would place the western view toward the
communication freedom end and the Soviet viewtoward the public order
end. The development point of view does not fit so comfortably on that
spectrum, although it probably fits between the western and Soviet posi-
tions. The development point of view emphasizes communication as a
freedom, but also as a source of change for the betterment of all of the
people in a given developing nation. Thus, it may be fair to say that the
development point of view emphasizes using communication initially to
improve the lot of the people, and secondarily, as a means of self-expres-
sion for individuals and groups.
It will no doubt be difficult to get further agreement on substantive
premises regarding rights to communicate, because of these divergent
views. However, it is possible to find support for conditional rights of ac-
cess and participation in each of the three philosophies which have been
described. None of these philosophies presents a principled claim that in-
dividuals and groups should be denied effective participation in mass me-
dia communications. Therefore, there is some hope that further discus-
sions on the right to communicate can achieve some meaningful
agreement on such rights.
Even if further discussion concerning the right to communicate leads
to description and general acceptance of rights such as access and partici-
pation, there will be the overriding problem of realization of these rights
in practice. Professor Louis Henkin has stated in the most recent edition
of his book, How Nations Behave:
The human rights norms set forth in the International Covenants,
particularly that on civil and political rights, compare with those en-
lightened libertarian national constitutions. Even the derogations and
exceptions, e.g., for national security or public order, are not on their
fact extravagant or unduly permissive. The weakness in the law is in
its enforcement, a weakness far greater here than in other interna-
tional law.
47
The primary problems facing the advocates of a right to communicate lie
in the areas of enforcement, voluntary compliance with the principles,
46. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 & 29, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at (1948). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). Article 29 of the Covenant specifically recognizes limita-
tion of communication freedoms by law in accordance with the requirements of public order.
47. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 232 (2d ed. 1979).
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and provision of the basic necessities which make communication possi-
ble. In some countries, the problems will be primarily political and legal,
that is, existing communications institutions may rigidly resist claims of
access. In other countries, the problems may be economic and social, for
example, public media such as local newspapers or radio stations may not
exist, or a lack of education may make access to and use of media of
relatively small importance.
The existing international communication norms are impressive. The
greater difficulties are found in the area of enforcement or realization of
those guarantees, rather than in the elaboration of new international
norms. However, this observation should not detract from the utility of
the efforts to articulate further communication rights. The very process of
trying to hammer out the content of a right to communicate or a right of
access creates a necessary conversation among these different world
views. If communication rights are to flourish on a worldwide scale, there
needs to be a continuous exchange between nations of views concerning
the appropriate role and the legal rights of communicators. At the end of
such discussions, one can hope that some common minimum of participa-
tion rights can be agreed to, and that, perhaps, some means for realizing
these communication rights can be established as well.
In conclusion, the consultations on the right to communicate have
contributed to the development of international communications institu-
tions. The consultations have evidenced a desire to enhance individual
and group participation in communications. If this is to be accomplished,
the statements of the right must be relatively clear and should stand in a
form that can be enforceable against some responsible party. More impor-
tantly, the proponents of access and participation rights should turn to
the difficult problems of implementation and enforcement. The world
stands much to gain from enhanced participation in communication, but
no principle, no matter how grand, can be effective without concrete
means of realizing its goals in practice.
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